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Phronesis as the Sense of the Event 
Ole Fogh Kirkeby 
In this article, the Greek concept of phronesis is analyzed on the basis of 
its philosophical roots, and the indispensability of its strong normative 
content is emphasized. This creates a distance to most of the recent under-
standing of phronesis as prudence, and hence as practical wisdom with a 
pragmatic and strategic content. The strong dilemmas created by the nor-
mative background of real phronesis present management and leadership 
as a choice in every situation. From this foundation, phronesis is inter-
preted as primarily the sense of the event, and an alternative concept of the 
event is developed. The presentation of the event also demands a theory of 
the relation of mind and matter, and hence of the body in the event. This is 
achieved under inspiration from Stoic philosophy. With this in mind, the 
more serious approaches to practical wisdom: phronesis as determinant  
of meta-concepts of research; phronesis as a liberating organizational 
strategy of learning; phronesis as a strategy of knowledge management; 
phronesis as a narrative strategy; and phronesis as the capacity of the 
leader, are presented and analyzed. Finally lines are drawn as to the  
importance of the consciousness of the event and of its theoretical impli-
cations, such as through the concept of phronesis for action research. 
Key words: phronesis, the theory of the event, the sense of the event, 
ethical imagination, radical normativity 
Presentation of the problem 
In recent years, the Greek concept of phronesis has properly speaking been 
invading Western culture, and especially the field of business economics, and 
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the field of management in particular, covering the fronts ranging from 
spiritual leadership to hardcore, strategic management. Sometimes it is even 
used as a line of demarcation between management and leadership. In a 
business world dominated by a new-liberalist capitalism liable to almost 
religious forms of control through an ethos of passionate devoted working 
life, phronesis has become both a means to instrumental dominance of the 
organization, and a rather lacerated meta-concept to legitimate and even to re-
negotiate the meaning of management. However, the hard facts stand out: the 
political consumer, the public world-eye watching the corporate behaviour, 
the pressures on products and technologies due to the upcoming environ-
mental catastrophe, and the chronic lack of understanding of principles of 
functioning of the capitalist economy, due to bad macroeconomic science and 
even more bad politics. Now the classical effects of the Kondratieff-cycle are 
here: capitalism has simply not got sufficiently new technologies to drive the 
canonical upsurge, and the chance to prevent the descent, the nurturing of 
third country overseas markets were neglected. Hopes now rest with global 
political initiatives, and the OECD appears to have accepted this new agenda.   
Phronesis seems, on the one hand, to be the perspective to develop man-
agement into a type of leadership which can honour the pressures by employ-
ees generally, and by elite knowledge workers in particular, in a market 
which for the first time in the history of Western capitalism moved towards 
full employment in the Western countries; and now, in the beginning of the 
crisis, on the other hand, to have the capacity to keep and change organiza-
tional culture at the same time. 
Since the Greeks made “Kairos”, the right moment, the essence of oppor-
tunity, into a god, and the modern world transformed it into a strategic con-
cept of (military) timing, the event has been seen as the centre of fruitful 
action, that which must be prepared for, the ever changing position from 
where history reveals itself, and the scene of dreams and visions of the future. 
Hence, it is obvious to define phronesis as the sense of the event.
It is of course important that this sense is not mistaken for the common 
sense of the situation, which is so often a vehicle for nurturing our own 
“enlightened” or more base interests. 
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As an epistemological framework of communication, with the central fo-
cus laid on dialogue, the sense of the event must be the sine qua non of action 
research. In this setting, phronesis would denote the capacity to receive and 
create, in relation to the being of the other person. To action research, the 
implicit doctrine of phronesis, that any person is a unique being, must both 
guide and legitimate this hyper-qualitative type of research. One could say 
that phronesis is an inter-relational capacity to become invisible and present 
at the very same time; a fly on the wall and a rock in the scenery. But first 
and foremost, action research presupposes sincerity and “authenticity” in the 
researcher, and hence, sympathy, if not compassion. Phronesis, nurturing on a 
deeply reflective earnestness and on distinct, clear and “confessed” values, is 
the way to create the event while at the same time “honouring” it, and action 
research is co-creating and co-receiving.   
However, when considering that phronesis since Socrates, as it is de-
scribed in a canonical, interpretative context as for example “Historische 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie”, Plato and his pupil, Aristotle, was the principle 
of normative action, the increasing dominance of one of its aspects of mean-
ing, prudency, needs explanation. The strategic and pragmatic twisting of its 
content could be found in recent managerial literature in so far as this aspect 
is becoming greater and greater. However, Aristotle, in the “Nicomachean 
Ethics”, restricted the cunning-aspect of practical wisdom (“metis”, 
“deinótes”, concepts not generally denoting the morally bad when taken out 
of this context) to the pragmatic, non-normative sides of action, and hence 
threw the light on its character as a means to realize power through rhetoric – 
and rhetoric forms, of course, are the trap of action research. The schism 
between ethical normativity and strategically shaped action is not just a 
schism, it is an aporia. But phronesis has to do with the capacity of a human 
being to ethically guide and develop itself as such, the capacity to the sui 
conservandi, so objectively vindicated by Thomas Hobbes, and at the same 
time the will and ability to act for the sake of the community, on the basis of 
reflectively affirmed duty. Phronesis is the meta-concept of intelligent, 
situated action. Thus it is the principle of the insightfully guided life which 
Socrates advocated, and it relates to all the spheres of our life, which after all 
only can mean the life in which a human being knows how to honor or be 
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worthy of the event – as the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus phrased it, and 
with him Gilles Deleuze (1990). Plato conceptualized this maxim, in the 
“Laws”, on his overall epistemological assumption that thinking is inner 
dialogue, and that man has an eristic relation to himself being permanently 
“at war with himself”. The victory hence is one over oneself, and it is the 
greatest of all victories (”nikan auton auton pason nikon prote te kai ariste” 
(Nomoi Bog I, 626E)). This immediately takes phronesis out of the self-
conservational context of prudence, since self-sacrifice is a possible conse-
quence. 
Plato claims that the inner expression of proving worthy of the event is to 
honour oneself above all except the gods (Nomoi 334 b-c.). Man must “fol-
low in the footprints of God” (”synakolouthesónton”) (Nomoi IV, 716B). 
As Plato (Menon 87 c11ff), and Aristotle (Nic. Eth. VI, 13 1144 b, 28-30), 
Socrates identifies virtue with knowledge, though accepting some not pro-
nounced normative “techniques” for realizing it (like knowledge or sense of 
the other person). What Socrates actually meant is difficult to say precisely, 
but one interpretation could be that he identified phronesis with a knowledge 
which could be discursively stated, even if this approaches paradox, since 
phronesis deals with the concrete act, and hence seems to require non-
discursive language or trans-reflective capacities. But he identified after all 
phronesis with that which produces “euprattein”, the satisfaction of acting on 
behalf of the Good. Plato apparently follows Socrates – though he recreates 
him – in claiming that phronesis is both a moral virtue, one of the four ca-
nonical Greek values, and that it is a meta-value, bringing reflectivity and 
deliberation into concrete action on the basis of virtues, and it is hence inher-
ent in all the virtues (Meno 88 d 3, Resp. IV 10 433 b 7-c 2). However, Plato 
is not consistent here (Resp. IX 13, 590 c 2-d 6), which sometimes implies 
the idea that reflectivity must be projected into the virtues from episteme. 
Since Plato, in between, substitutes “sophia” (contemplative wisdom) for 
phronesis, he seems aware of the importance to place the normative aspect 
over the prudential, or to rule the latter out as a possible sense of phronesis. 
However Plato also uses phronesis in the more idiomatic sense, meaning just 
the capacity to reflect (Philebus) – this might go back to Heraclitus’ use of 
the concepts as a substitute for “nous”, thinking. Plato also accepts the possi-
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bility of a non-virtuous use of phronesis, the “panurgia” the way of the 
villain. However he generally seems most inclined to define phronesis as 
knowledge of the quasi-transcendent ideas of the good, the just, the true and 
the beautiful, because he identifies it with “episteme”, which is a knowledge 
of the necessary and eternal, and this is strictly in opposition to Aristotle’s 
emphasis of phronesis as pertaining to the contingent sphere only, having no 
possibility of applying the apophantic knowledge. (Resp. VI, 18, 506 b 2). In 
Aristotle this is basic in the development of argument in the “Topics”, “The 
Nicomachean Ethics”, and in “The Art of Rhetoric”.  
Thus it is possible to conclude that Plato was inclined to conceive of 
phronesis as a kind of knowledge, which did only differ from genuine theo-
retical, and hence, discursive knowledge, in so far that the eternal ideas of 
knowledge have a certain transcendence – the famous passages from “The 
Symposion” suggests that beauty is an almost direct incarnation (parousia) of 
eternal ideas on the phenomenological level. Tacit knowledge would, to 
Plato, belong to the imperfect realm of “aesthesis”, even if he acknowledges 
that the wise ruler has to have practical knowledge (Resp. VII, 18 539, e 2-5). 
In this article the phronesis of Plato is preferred to that of Aristotle.   
Aristotle is, in the conception of phronesis, committed to his more empiri-
cal and more pragmatic approach to philosophy. He sticks to Plato’s concep-
tion of phronesis as a reflective capacity in relation to life, but rejects its 
identification with “episteme” and “sophia”, since it deals with human acts, 
and since they are phenomena which could have been otherwise. The realm 
of the “endechomen”, the possible which has no determinant necessity, is the 
sphere of phronesis (Nic. Ech. 1140 a, 31 b 6). Phronesis does not deal with 
the subject of episteme, the general and abstract, but with the singular, “ta 
kath’ hékasta”. (Nic.Eth. VI, 6-8). Phronesis has its peculiar character in 
relating to action, to that which can be done, “to praktón”, and hence it is a 
species of the genus “praxis”, and differs from “poiesis”, and its dependency 
on “techné”. Techne, contrary to what one might think, does not work on the 
basis of “nous”, intuitive intellectual knowledge. This is due to the fact that 
artistic making (poiesis) has its goal outside itself (Nic. Ech. 1140 b6 f), and 
thus has no theoretical first principles, while praxis can have an inherent goal 
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(to do the good for the goods own sake). The passages referred to are proba-
bly the most famous about phronesis in philosophical literature. 
To Aristotle virtue (areté) and phronesis are reciprocally interdependent 
(Nic Eth. 1144 b 30-32). 
Forceful and successful action without ethical basis is named “deinótes”, a 
concept which later was to be important as the terminus for the convincing 
capacity of the rhetor (Nic.Eth. 1144 a 23-29). 
Since Aristotle emphasized that it is impossible to find ethical rules which 
can make the realization of maxims possible – as Kant did many years later – 
interpreters have widely discussed which type of knowledge he actually 
refers to as supporting the ethical intention of the “ethike arête”, of the moral 
person. Aristotle’s own solution is beyond doubt the formation of character 
through hard efforts to live the virtues and the values, a process which he 
names “hexis” (translated by Cicero into “habitus”, a word rather misleading 
due to its generative relation to “habit”), and in which the knowledge of 
values and virtues giving through the “paideia” (life-long learning) is deep-
ened and made real by trying to realize them. As always, in classical Greek 
thought and in Hellenism, the utmost purpose is the “ton ef’ temin”, to be the 
master of one’s own life, and its resulting in happiness (“eudaimonía”).    
The rather equivocal work of Aristotle on phronesis has stimulated psy-
chologists and management researchers to try to anchor the ambiguous and 
analytically weak concepts of tacit knowledge and intuition in phronesis as a 
means to conceptualize prudence. This has blurred its normative essence, 
though there are exceptions. However, there can be no doubt that knowledge 
of norms and values does not suffice for living ethically in the event. We 
must master knowledge of ourselves and of the other person, the capacity to 
use the sense of judgment, use ethical imagination, produce overall views, 
and not at least to have a utopian vision of a just society. But above all we 
have to reflect on the possibilities of coping with the unpredicted and unex-
pected, as human beings, and as politicians, administers and managers, as 
well. All this is summed up in the sense of the event.  
However, logically and historically this presupposes the constitution of 
historical science done some fifty years before Aristotle by Thucidides.  
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Let us now investigate the event and one theory about it which I have de-
veloped over my many years working with this subject, and deduce phronesis 
from it. 
Process and event 
Behind the conceptual handling of the phenomenon of process, there lies far 
more than the paradoxes displayed by Zeno, namely the semantic and syntac-
tic barriers of language games, the common games of truth, the “koiné aisthe-
sis” (Aristotle’s concept from “De anima”), and the “koina ennoia” (Stoics), 
the forms of experience and thought emerging from them. 
This is not due to the one-dimensional conclusion that words and proposi-
tions have a representational character. They have indeed, but this representa-
tion is not, as Locke and Hume thought, a denotation by the (conventional) 
sign of inner ideas wielded from sense impressions (the concept of “phanta-
sia” from Greek philosophy). The fallacy consists in not seeing that words 
create what they refer to as an always ambiguous and unfinished meaning, 
and in that they always differ in relation to the event in which they are spo-
ken, and in relation to the context of this event, and the context of contexts. 
The great problem then is how to get a hold of language so that it can ex-
press the phenomenon of process, hereby transcending the forms of thought 
bound to common sense (“koiné aisthesis”, “sensus communis”). 
The answer must be put immediately: There is one and only one solution 
to this problem, namely that the event in some sense does not exist. 
This of course demands some epistemological and ontological reserva-
tions about the meaning of the word “exist”. 
Generally people would say that something which we are able to perceive 
does exist. This also counts for a process in the capacity of movements, 
shades, clouds, and so on, in which no proper forms can be distinguished. 
Existence is normally tied to both the possible perception of an entity and 
hence, of some substance, and to the fact that a word can be found for this 
appearance. Or better, that there might exist some word demoting the per-
ceived, even if we do not know it. When looking into an open human torso 
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we might not be able to name the different entrails, but to speak of bowels 
might suffice to match the experience for at lot of people.    
When we state that the event does not exist, it must mean that neither does 
a singular conceptual, discursive experience answer to it, and in a more 
restricted sense no subject of experience. Neither does there at the pre-
discursive level exist any comprehensive “understanding” of this event. The 
event is “an sich”, a “noumenon”, above the distinction between object and 
subject. A clearly not satisfying analogy, but perhaps the nearest, would be to 
say that at the beginning of the universe we had a genuine event which has no 
object, because there was nothing outside this event. However there must 
have been something, because, as Plato taught us in the “Parmenides” the 
same cannot be conceived without presupposing otherness. But before the 
universe began there was perhaps nothing, and this would better match the 
concept of an event which at this abstract level is said not to exist. 
When I say that the event “does not exist”, I use this concept at several 
different ontological levels. No, one could object that, to the dead and their 
families, the event 9/11certainly existed as something ultra-real and the traces 
of its material reality could be witnessed for years by the site, and will be 
incorporated into the new buildings. Also it was conserved on news papers, 
television, in amateur films, and in memories. It exists as an overall public 
topic. 
Anyhow, what did actually happen is not sufficiently explained, and thus 
naming it must always rely on hypothetical suppositions. The causal level of 
explanation contains different hypothesis, among others the raising impor-
tance of conspiracy-theories, and nobody is able to survey the totality of the 
event. This means that there exists no coherent narrative into which this event 
could be inscribed. Then it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualize this 
event as a species, to define “the objective of preparedness in relation to the 
catastrophic event itself” (Stattler/Roos/Victor 2006: 7) Recent upsurges in 
strategic focus on “preparedness” since authorities have great difficulties in 
generalizing significantly from that which happened to that which might 
happen in the future. They have an immediately connected difficulty in 
defining criteria of assessment for lack of a definite hierarchy of values, 
especially as relevant economic parameters including all losses and related 
76 Ole Fogh Kirkeby 
gains (ibid.: 8). If “also” the human lives, and the consequences on world 
politics and general attitudes towards life are calculated, we are confronted 
with the fact that what “actually happened” cannot be “fully” understood 
until the future, if understood at all. Billions of “facts” would have to be 
incorporated, but in spite of immense computer power the processing of facts 
shall not suffice. Estimations as to the balance of loss and gain have to be 
created, and hence values are involved.  
However, this is a statement of the non-existence of the event at a rather 
“concrete” ontological level, and apparently not with direct ontological 
implications.  
It seems of course a contradictio in adjecto to speak at any level about the 
event which “is” not, and this dilemma was genially presented to us by 
Nicolaus Cusanus in his “Trialog de li non aliud” with the famous phrasing: 
“non aliud non aliud est quam non aliud”. (“The not other is nothing but the 
not-other”), (Cusanus: 1979). This a positive phrasing of the inaccessible 
level of a noumenon, and in such a sophisticated thinker as Cusanus, it is not 
only a repetition of Plotin’s model of the transcendent One and its emergent 
levels of reality, but simply the statement of a figure of thought which is 
meant to transgress both ontology, and in the end also its own epistemology.   
Since, due to recent theories of “flat time”, but to common sense too, any 
process consists of events being positions in a coordinate system with a basic 
time on the one side, and relative or subjective time on the other (relative 
time does not need to be subjective time, but could be immeasurable or not 
measured time, because there is no constant), every concept of process which 
presumes that the event has an ontological existence must presume a move-
ment by stages, be they ever so short, and be their causal relations ever so 
complicated and even non-linear. This is a necessity because the event is 
identified which the word or proposition denoting it, whether it is a general 
concept or a concept for a singular occurrence, and language and thinking 
demand the concept of the causal, as Kant stated. So Alfred North White-
head’s proceeding by occurrences in his book “Process and Reality” is wrong 
concerning the basis for a theory of process, and thus Gilles Deleuze, the 
most influential among the new “process-thinkers”, a philosopher heavily 
indebted to Whitehead, cannot completely master the conceptual approach to 
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the phenomenon of process. The other great influence on the process-thinking 
of Deleuze, Henri Bergson, might be better equipped to escape the paradoxes 
of Zeno.
Alain Badiou comes a bit closer to understanding the event in his first 
book on the event, “Being and Event”, when he says: That what counts is not 
just “how does one think non-being?” but also “how does one name non-
being?” The proper name is neither the transcendent God’s nor some aspect 
of genuine presence, but the “un-presentation and the un-being of the one”. 
Thus it cannot be interpreted in a Kantian way as a guaranty of the validity of 
sense impressions – which Badiou naturally must try to establish too (Badiou 
2006). 
However Badiou does not go far enough, because the event must be con-
ceptually framed at several epistemological levels beyond the determination 
of its trans-ontological status, it must be seen as an active area of non-sense 
working in the midst of our experience; as “an empty place”, as Roland 
Barthes once framed it in his magnificent book on Japanese culture (Barthes 
2006). 
Following Badiou, the event has no objective existence; but since it exhib-
its a distinctively reflexive structure, it only occurs through what Badiou 
(2006: 181) calls an 'interpretative intervention'. The event is called into 
existence through the subject who recognizes it, or who nominates it as an 
event, and keeps faithful to it. However, from this perspective only the 
acceptance of a material causal level could guarantee that the transformation 
of individual interpretations into narratives of a wider sense, like the one of 
the French Revolution, would be more than the results of negotiations of 
nothing, i.e. of a phantasm, and random consensuses. 
The alternative is that the event becomes a “phantasma” (“simulacra” in 
Latin) per se. So, in some sense it must be meaningful to state that the event 
does not exist. But this demands another level of ontology than the first one 
presented here.  
It must be rather obvious that no event can be sufficiently grasped by a 
word or by a proposition, be it ever so simple. This is due to the fact that 
nobody could experience the totality of an event, not even billions of cameras 
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could do it.1 Every phrasing is an approximation, so the ontological level of 
what I call the alma-event – the second level of ontology, then – must pre-
sume the at least preliminary constitution of a subject and an object in some 
sense. If we conceive of the event as an empty place, and hence as place after 
all, it must be inside space and thus inside time. If this empty place is said to 
be experienced, it would be a metaphor for the impossibility to perceive the 
event as a process or as a moving constellation of objects. It would have no 
content. But we know and feel that the event is something. An accident 
cannot be explained away, it leaves perhaps terrible effects on physical and 
psychical being.  
If we, by the empty place, mean that the thought of it has no object, as 
Hegel phrased it in his “Enzyklopädie” one could object that we after all 
might visualize it unwillingly over and over again – the car hitting the body 
for example; and that such traumas are sadly real. Anyhow the total event 
cannot take the form of a “real” object, i.e. an object confirmed by social 
experience in opposition to private experience, since it would demand a 
union of all actual, and perhaps also potential, perspectives on it. 
We are “epistemologically” accustomed to think of the event as being out-
side us, but of course it also lives inside us in the capacity of memory. Berg-
son distinguished between “pure memory” and “image-memory”, the pure 
memory containing the total memory at a non-conscious level, a sleep only 
broken by the pragmatics use of individual memories as images of experience 
needed by perception to cope with circumstance. (Bergson 2007: Chapter 
III). Bergson presents his famous concept of “duration” in this context, and 
claims that memory is immaterial and obeying another principle of time, less 
structured than the horizon (in Husserl’s later sense) of the external world 
with its virtual space of experiences. However, consciousness might have its 
own “alma-event”, and I developed a theory about this empty space of the 
                                          
1  When billions of video cameras filmed a small and limited event in space and time, for 
example a short encounter between two friends in a super market, they had to be trans-
formed into a format which allowed people to watch it in real time, and yet this trans-
formation would just postpone the problem, since this reception, already an interpreta-
tion, had to be interpreted too, and so on in infinity. Computer interpretation would 
only postpone this predicament. Behind this the problem of the never finished, seman-
tic character of the event hides itself.    
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“bottom” of the mind (Kirkeby 2008). Actually Epicurus, according to Dio-
genes Laertius, thought along the same lines with his concept of “akathono-
maston”, the unnamable place of the relation between body and mind.   
It is obvious that the hypothesis of this second ontological level of the 
event presupposes a concept of the moment in relation to the now. The now is 
seen as a point without extension, as a passage leading from the future to the 
past, making the present non-existent. Every experience is already in the past, 
as Bergson says. However the moment contains duration, and hence, consid-
ering its difference from the “now”, it is outside or inside time. Bergson does 
not draw these conclusions, but I do, like probably also Meister Eckehart, 
Cusanus, and Soeren Kierkegaard. 
First and foremost the conceptualization of the event must meet two de-
mands arising in our common sense, and from generally all known games of 
language, beyond their inherent difference in syntactic and semantic notions 
of time. These two demands are the conceptualization of process and of 
factuality (“Faktizität”). They both refer to some a priori concept of time, 
found in the distinction between the “nunc permanens” and the “nunc stans” 
of Scholastic philosophy. Nunc permanens is finite, eternal time and space, 
laid out as a map without movement to the eye of God. It is the history of the 
world unfolded (“explicatum” in Nicolas Cusanus) as a stasis. Nunc stans is 
the infolded (“implicatum”) world, pressed into one moment of experience 
and knowledge. This knowledge then, cannot be in real time, but presupposes 
the duration of the moment beyond time. This “experience” answers to the 
“theoria”, the “contemplatio” of Aristotle but also has the connotation of the 
Gnostic and Christian concept of “epiphany” or “parousia”, the appearance of 
the absolute in time. 
These two demands, the conceptualization of process and of factuality, 
go back to Greek philosophy – “process” was the concept of Heraclitus, and 
“factuality” is formed from “fact” originating in Latin “factum”, “event, 
occurrence, thing done” and “factuality” might be a translation of the 
Aristotelean “tode ti” under inspiration from the Scholastic concept of Duns 
Scotus, “haecceitas”, playing a great role in Heidegger and Deleuze as “das 
Faktizität” and as “the singular” and the “unique”, as the immediate 
(re)presentation of the external world to experience.  
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We experience the transient character of the moment of the event, and 
hence its contextual ambiguity and we feel its irrevocability. 
Much wisdom refers to the nunc stans, to the capacity to stay in the mo-
ment, even to enjoy it, and to come into contact with the real force of life. As 
to phronesis as practical wisdom this could hardly be an option, since action 
takes place in real time, and organizations do not exactly cherish a contem-
plation which cannot be controlled.  
Phronesis must of course be a capacity which is able to guide the event 
into social reality, this is not at least underlined by its importance to man-
agement. But as a procedure of the “right naming of the event” it must be 
totally obliged to the normative claims. This claim of normativity is projected 
onto us the more the free space of the possibilities of naming is realized, i.e. 
manifested through the metaphor of emptiness.  
Considering the idiomatic senses of event in English, “to take place”, “to 
happen”, “accident”, “incident” and “occurrence” we can create a conceptual 
hierarchy. But due to the first ontological level, the non-aliud, perhaps hap-
pening, or just happen, connoting the lack of subject-object-relation is the 
real genus. 
To happen 
The moment: time outside/inside time 
The event 
To take place 
The now: The point in time 
Incident accident occurrence 
Dialogue
Now, from this the relevance of this epistemological gymnastics of the event 
could reveal their relevance to action research. Because the existence of 
external and internal empty spaces blocking final knowledge of both the 
event and of our own mind, warn us not to believe that we could understand 
either of them. When we cannot say definitely what took place, or who we 
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are, then approaches to other persons must be invested with a tentative care-
fulness. However, the programme of investigation, being through this post-
poned permanently into the preliminary zone of the future, might also contain 
lines of flight, and normative-utopian considerations.   
The Stoic philosophers who were the first to develop a systematic and 
complex theory of the event distinguished between pragma and tynchanon,
between a level of sense, and a material level. In Stoic philosophy the corpo-
real realm consisted of space, objects, voice, emotions, thought and mental 
impressions and images or “ideas” (phantasma). The incorporeal realm 
consisted of time, the void, and sense. If the event is conceived only at the 
pragma-level it would presume an extremely constructivist view – as Deleuze 
and Badiou seem inclined to do -, and also have a hyper-idealistic character. 
So, the material level must be considered too, and it has its own reality 
although it is always subject to intentional experience. The reality of the 
material level is guaranteed by physics, and thus it is also a construct seen 
epistemologically and ontologically. But everyday experience relates to 
physical bodies and things, and to their relations. The bullet is there, the 
wound is there, the cry is there. They are obvious facts, even if they might 
make sense, or even lack sense, in many ways.  
What does not exist properly is something which cannot be the object of 
perception, and which cannot be named, although it is there. This might, as 
already mentioned, denote a thinking without a subject, an all-comprehensive
“noesis noeseos”, or “cogito cogitans”, the thinking of itself by thought, 
which, at the same time, could also be a “cogito cogitandum”, a thought that 
ought to be thought – referring to Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” and to the opus 
of Descartes. However, this genuine act of reflectivity is not enough to catch 
this dimension of a trans-experiential experience. Perhaps the concept of 
“significance” is more apt in this connection by referring moods and “non-
discursive” emotional states. This “experience” has no phenomenal character. 
It does not appear. How then, can it still be?  
The only answer is that this empty place of the event is where the world 
and the mind meet in the depth of the body-mind, in the capacity of an em-
bodied “phronema”, a sense of self expressing a practical reflectivity.  
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This material level is the body, and its chiastic incorporation into lan-
guage confirms this physicality through the material character of the voice.   
I have developed three levels which display a trans-ontological level, and 
two ontological levels, the last one appearing in the process of trying to name 
the event (Kirkeby 2005).2 This “proto-event” of the bodily level has always 
the second level inherent in it, the “alma-event” the sense-defying activity of 
the event as a virtual thought without an object. Both these levels are shaped 
by the ontology of the body as “body-mind”.3
The way in which the body-mind and the event melt into each other cre-
ates the empty space of sense, the untrodden zone, or the trans-reflective 
domain.  
When we accept that the core of a process, the event, can never be named 
sufficiently, because the naming itself is part of a new event which trans-
forms the very gesture and the conditions of denotation, the process shall not 
consist of occurrences in the capacities of “elements”. The mind cannot 
reflect the passage between events which come to be when an event is ex-
perienced, and transformed from a presence into the past. 
The body-mind is the carrier of the process, and the event is its content.  
The body is the medium of process, and it is the concept without a 
thought, because it is that which can neither experience its own experience 
nor think its own thinking. Hence, the event can never be a full subject of 
consciousness, but ascribing sense is restricted by the body as the world of 
the event, and as the event of World.4
                                          
2  In my three books on the event from 2005-2008, written in Danish: Eventum tantum – 
the Ethos of the Event; The Event of Beauty – the Aesthetics of the Event; and The Self
Happens – the Event of Consciousness. In English I presented the thoughts of the two 
first books in two articles in the net journal “Ephemera”. In relation to leadership of 
the event I wrote the book “Management of the Event and the Force of Action” in 
2007 (in Danish), and in English I wrote the books Management Philosophy. A Radi-
cal-Normative Perspective. New York: Springer 2000, and The Virtue of Leadership.
Copenhagen: CBS-Publishers 2008.  
3  I presented the theory of the body-mind in my doctorial thesis from 1994 Body-Mind 
and Event. A Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Analysis (in Danish). 
4  These epistemological conditions are reinforced to our minds when we reflect on 
memory. Memory has got similarities to the young earth in that it is subject to violent 
and permanent transformation. Since there is no definite goals of this transformation-
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From this some implications as to phronesis can already be drawn. The 
fabulous Stoics always concentrated on the body as a jail (the wordplay 
“soma/sema” already in Plato), and hence as the Trajan Horse of the world in 
our minds through the fate of desires and passion. From their perspective, 
philosophy is the means to control the body – they even tended to underline 
this perspective by claiming that the whole body is thought and hence can be 
controlled by mind. Phronesis in this Hellenist tradition must then be under-
stood as the way of being master of the way in which the event takes posses-
sion of the body. This is done through an ethos of desiring the Good only. 
Phronesis then, is the mode of being which guides us in controlling the 
passions and seeking beyond the “kathékon”, the “normal” level of the 
feeling of duty into the state of the “katorthoma”, the ultimate wisdom.  
This conception is repeated in the Neo-Stoicism of the Baroque, for ex-
ample in the best seller by Justus Lipsius, “De Constantia” from 1584 or in 
the essays of Montaigne. 
Due to classical Greek philosophy the four cardinal virtues, “andreia” 
(courage), “dikaiósyne” (justice), “sophrosyne” (temperance) and “phronesis” 
are all functions of phronesis itself. Plato said that to have one virtue means 
to posses them all (Protagoras 329 c ff). The meta-virtue is actually phronesis 
in both Plato and Aristotle.  
The ethos of the event developed by the Stoics is phrased with great 
power by Epictetus: 
“Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but 
wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life 
will be serene.” (Encheiridion, Paragraph 8). 
                                          
process but only the set of possible ones posited within the field allowed for by evolu-
tionary laws, every new minute something could happen which would change the or-
bits of development lines and retrospectively change their sense as causal chains. E-
mergent new stages, leaps, are only possible when they have been carefully prepared 
for by absorptions of relevant events in the bodies of earth or man, and so it is with the 
sudden capacity to overcome oneself through a phronetic act. The Laplacian perspec-
tive on evolution emphasizing the teleological aspect must also be projected on phro-
nesis: We carefully prepare for the unexpected which we have made possible. Both 
Husserl and Bergson failed to see this “working” autonomy of memory, the former 
relying too little on the transforming powers of the moment of the perceptional event, 
the latter too much (Kirkeby 2008).   
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However, this cannot be enough to develop an ethics. Much more is de-
manded. I created two other maxims besides “proving worthy of the event”, 
namely “to guard the secret of the event”, and “to prepare the world for the 
event”. These two maxims prepare the individual to active ethical praxis, to 
ethical imagination, and to utopian and political vision. Thus the core prob-
lem of human existence as seen from the event is to transform our mindset 
and conceptual framework into action. This also explains why the theory of 
the event must be the meta-theory of action research. 
How matter and mind is related 
In action research the great question is “How to speak?” when we want 
information that both we and the interlocutor do not know that they know.  
We saw that to the Stoics the voice was material, and that the working of 
the mind was seen so too. 
In speech sense is created, and sense is incorporeal. This demands a the-
ory of speech. I coined the principle of translocutionarity many years ago in 
my doctorial thesis “Event and Body-Mind. A Phenomenological-
Hermeneutical investigation.” (1994). This principle says that when I hear 
myself thinking or speaking, I recognize something at work in these proc-
esses of sense production. This can never be directly articulated, and even if 
we for example are inclined to identify it with a feeling of shame or unjusti-
fied hostility already immediately in the process of thinking or speaking, it is 
not the sensed significance proper. 
The principle of translocutionarity says: 
I do not know what I mean until I hear what I myself am saying. 
I do not know what I do until I experience myself doing it. 
I do not know what I can until we experience ourselves performing it.  
Thus, through a physical act sense is created, and through the communicative 
power of sense, the material world of the other person’s mind is moved. 
This reciprocal effect controls my processes of experience and knowl-
edge.
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This is exactly what is meant by wisdom in the Stoics: To master these 
processes of transformation by “synkatathesis”, by accepting or denying 
sense.
The problem is to command one’s own inner world through incorporeal 
sense, through the logos, a world which is totally physical; and to be able to 
master all impressions from without. This means to be able to choose the 
event as it actually happened.  
Marcus Auerelius said in his “Thoughts to myself” that the only thing 
which distinguishes a human being from a pig is that when the latter is drawn 
to the butcher it cries, but man can chose not to.  
So, our body as a material being could be said to be ahead of us – as hy-
pothesized by B. Libet and Gray5 –, acting at a physical level, which is 
inscribed in sense. This sense cannot be voluntarily chosen, as Deleuze and 
Badiou seem to think, but must be worked out, on the one hand through 
mastering our own mind; on the other hand through communication. 
Social activism was not an option of the reverent Stoic wise man, but a 
passive activism controlling the mind was the ideal, and hence controlling the 
prejudices of the “doxa”, and one’s own behavior. 
In this Stoicism does not only differ from Christianity – Pascal scorned its 
lack of humility – but from the classical Greek roots of the phronesis as 
shaped by Plato and Aristotle. 
One could say that the Stoic ideal of being rested on the capacity to use 
the empty place between the mind and the world, which I earlier spoke about, 
letting the event of the self form a no-man’s-land of perceptional freedom.  
Phronesis then has to do both with mastering one’s own thought through 
controlling speech by an inner mechanism of the veto, or simply by thinking, 
                                          
5  Gray (2004) and Libet (1986) claim that we become aware of willing an action only 
after the unconscious part of the brain causes it. Libet (1986) demonstrated that sub-
jects show a readiness-potential for a ‘willed’ behavior before they report becoming 
aware of willing that behavior. From this he created the hypothesis that the uncon-
scious part of the brain causes behavior independently of our conscious sensation of 
willing. To gauge the relation between unconscious potential of readiness and subjec-
tive feelings of volition and action, Libet required an objective method of marking the 
subject's conscious experience of the will to perform an action in time, and afterward 
comparing this information with data recording the brain's electrical activity during the 
same interval.  
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and hence, feeling, in another way. Neither must the speech of the other be 
able to touch you, nor must you be touched by your own speech and driven 
by it. You must be able to control the event. 
In this we can find modern ideals of dialogue like Martin Buber’s, Gabriel 
Marcel’s, and Carl Roger’s, but in a much more pronounced altruistic setting. 
Phronesis was always first and foremost the propaedeutic basis of protreptic, 
the art of mastering dialogue in relation to basic values. 
The concept of phronesis 
“Phronesis” is the sense of the event in its classical Greek roots. This implies 
a sense of the possible and a sense of the self (“epimeleia heautou”, “cura 
sui”) too, because phronesis must produce “euprattein”, the feeling of having 
acted ethically right.6
Considering that phronesis in a managerial context deals with building 
preparedness or a readiness which due to the unpredictable character of the 
unforeseen cannot rely on models of theoretical predictions, it could be 
tempting to interpret phronesis as a sort of intuitive capacity to act spontane-
ously and with cunning – capabilities relative to the challenges of the unpre-
dictable event. Empirically such action often seems more instrumental than 
normative. The challenge of phronesis then must be to let all immediate 
action be guided by an inherent normativity. This is a rather obvious task 
since organizations create our reality by projecting the future through prod-
ucts, services and HR, and in relation to catastrophes evaluation and weight-
ing of interests often life-important between groups are pertinent. 
Johan Roos and Matt Statler (2006: 105) use phronesis as a meta-concept 
do criticize management science’s obligation to theories and laws as the 
conditions of action. They argue that especially the preparation for the unpre-
pared event demands a normative stand. They refer to Sternberg (1998, 2001, 
2004), Clegg and Roos-Smith (2003), and Tsoukas and Cummings (1997) to 
defend their view. 
                                          
6  The next one and a half pages are borrowed from forthcoming book ”Protreptic – the 
Concept and the Art.” 
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Phronesis is characterized by being always normative action. Norms are 
often identified with values. A value is always far more than a maxim. It is 
the mental environment in which the maxim makes sense. By it the disposi-
tions, the emotional atmosphere, and the relevant modes of reflection which 
they give raise to, are conjured up, and hence the possible ways of action are 
prescribed (Kirkeby 2003). Due to the uniqueness and complexity of any 
event values must be foci of attention, and hence, individual modes of lead-
ing one’s experience towards the right goals, and towards the goal as set by a 
norm. A value is a set of criteria for distinguishing salient traits in the event, 
and a tacit capacity for acting this knowledge out guided by the image of the 
other person conveyed by benevolence. Feeling responsible towards another 
person limits the strategic use of psychological common sense knowledge 
often so brutal and cynical in its core.  
The mental functioning of values are inextricably connected to two ca-
pacities philosophically related to the aesthetics of Immanuel Kant, the sense 
or capacity of judgment, and imagination. The capacity of judgment appears 
where reason does not suffice, or when the relevant or sufficient information 
is lacking. Situational imagination is a type of event-sense making it feasible 
to realize a value in all situations.  
The capacity of judgment is sometimes understood as an aspect of the 
Greek concept of “phronesis”. Because it has several meta-levels in Aristotle, 
and because it was translated and transferred through different interpreta-
tions, phronesis can be difficult to press into a univocal definition. 
Phronesis is the core concept in the book on “Protreptic” by Aristotle. 
However, its modern interpretation is often very diffuse, because it is trans-
lated by “practical wisdom” and in Latin by “prudentia” and “sapientia”, 
concepts also found in English. But phronesis is not prudency, neither is it 
just sapience. The problems arise, because the Greek did not distinguish 
between theoretical and practical knowledge in the same way as we do. In the 
Greek thought successful practice means a practice which is in harmony both 
with the state of the world in the event, with the norms of society, and with 
the mind of the actor. However, harmony of mind is only possible on the 
basis of an ethical attitude. Practical wisdom does not mean mere empirical 
knowledge of men and their affairs, but knowledge of oneself. However, 
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knowledge of oneself is at the same time knowledge of the ethical norms and 
the capacity to realize them. This means that phronesis is incorporated in 
ethical virtues. No virtue can be realized without phronesis, but even if 
phronesis does not suppose apophantic knowledge, because it deals with the 
possible, not with the necessary, it presupposes intuitive knowledge, ”nous”, 
and both a portion of knowledge of truth, episteme, and a genuine wisdom of 
the absolute, ”sophia” or ”gnosis”.  
The capacity to live for the virtues might to a certain degree be an inborn 
capacity, it belongs to the ”aristos”, to the gentleman of noble decent – this is 
certainly the view of Aristotle – and it is a product of the upbringing and 
lifelong learning (the paideia), but it is first and foremost a result of “aske-
sis”, of hard work to perfect oneself. So nobility has quite another sense than 
to us, in the end it means a quality which one grants oneself. 
Phronesis is given to us through the way we act in the event. It is the junc-
tion of our “êthos”, of our constitutional character, and of our “ethos”, our 
will and capacity to transform the given, normative values into action, and 
through this effort to create our character (ethopoiesis). This is the essence of 
the concept of “virtue” (Kirkeby 2008). 
Phronesis is the event-sense, and a normatively guided sense. It is the 
principle of self-reflection, and is directed towards the winning of the war 
against oneself – as Plato speaks of in the dialogue, “The Laws”. Phronesis 
opens and guides the entrance to the self by mastering its becoming, and it 
produces the right feeling of self, the ”ho phronema”. Thus phronesis exem-
plifies the movement denoted by the concept of “hexis”, a self chosen, delib-
erate, action-directed “tropos”, a state or disposition permanently created by 
an inner force. 
This is the way in which Aristotle argues in his Nicomachean Ethics. 
Hence, phronesis manifests itself in an ethical fantasy in the event and is 
directed towards the other person, but it is also a way to help oneself to the 
ideal of “ton ef’ hemin”, to master one’s life. Since Plato, phronesis was also 
directed to actions which strengthen the community. The paideia demands 
that the care for one self must always be a care for community too, since 
norms are of a social, and hence of a general character due to the fact that 
similarities dominate over differences across history and culture, – be they 
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ever so locally limited as to Athens. It implies a radical sense of possibilities, 
combining experience, and memory with thought. Phronesis is an individual 
strategy of “epimeleia heautu”, of taking care of oneself, but it is both a meta-
value at the highest level of the moral virtues, and a dianoetic, or intellectual 
virtue, being both (as already stated) a species of praxis, and poiesis, and in 
the end contemplation – “theoria”, “deep insight”, and the mind-forming 
result of phronesis being translated in Latin into “contemplation”. Thus 
phronesis is always more than poiesis, it is a practice in which the good is 
practiced for the sake of the good.  
We have a very precise treatment of phronesis by Matt Statler and Johan 
Ross when they write: 
“Precisely in view of the tension between science and cunning, Aristotle 
helps us to define practical wisdom (‘phronesis’) as the virtuous habit of 
making decisions and taking actions that serve the common good. This 
distinct form of human intelligence effectively serves the good of the 
community even in the face of ambiguous or uncertain circumstances. 
Thus precisely where the predictive capacity of scientific knowledge 
breaks down, practical wisdom addresses normative considerations about 
what should occur in the future. Similarly, though practical wisdom may 
draw on cunning to realize such normative goals, it disciplines cunning to 
avoid deception and to focus on advantages that may be shared by all 
members of society” (Statler/Roos 2006: 101).
This determination of phronesis puts severe limits as to its use in business 
economics. It cannot refer to the clever or even smart way of handling things. 
There is no compromise in phronesis as to its strategic, pragmatic, and func-
tional use. In Greek thought its functional basis is the “eudaimonia”, the 
union of psychic and physical bliss, and this can only be obtained through 
acting out the good (“euprattein”). This must be considered when it is trans-
lated into “wisdom”, especially in a capitalist society. Hence, the radical 
impact of phronesis constitutes no anachronism, but a challenge. 
Phronesis is a utopian concept designing a future community of the ethi-
cally perfect human beings. Every phronetic act must be done with this in 
mind. The “Res publica” of Plato is such a utopia of phronesis, even if it is 
not a democratic society in our sence. However, aristocracy might be neither 
the necessary nor the sufficient condition for an “ethical society”. 
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Since phronesis demands a hexis, which means a lifelong elaboration on 
changing oneself in the image of the values embodied in virtues, and passion 
in the capacities of “epithymos” and “hormé” were seen by the Greeks as the 
main inner enemy, every human being must be invested with practical as-
sumptions and instruments for strategic assessment of the event, and prag-
matic psychological knowledge of the other person. Even “endoxa”, the wiser 
part of common sense, has this character. Realizing ethical fantasy in percep-
tion seems after all rather difficult to obtain. This means that phronesis 
presents us to an eternal dilemma. Its nature is aporetic, it contains the ten-
sion between the genuine normative and the strategic.  
However, phronesis is also a meta-capacity to overview this aporia be-
tween the levels of phronesis. This is why it is both a moral and an intellec-
tual virtue in Aristotle. We cannot escape this dilemma, but the prudential 
side of it must not be given too much emphasis, if we are to save the content 
of the concept.  
It is important to realize that the Greek classical philosophy did not accept 
humility, resignation, and contemplative passivity. It is a philosophy of the 
self and of the social. This implicates that there is a conflict between Aris-
totle and the Stoics as to the content of phronesis. Recent use of the concept 
“practical wisdom” all refer to Aristotle since he propagates action, not 
putting up with or resigning. This, of course, increases the normative de-
mands on the basis of phronesis. 
When phronesis is seen as a hexis one might be prepared to underpin the 
often emphasized concept of “the middle” in Aristotelean thought. By this 
one could smuggle cunning into the normative. A hexis as the container of an 
ethical imagination must nurture normative tacit knowledge and intuition, but 
to develop this takes a lot of time, and even normative tacit knowledge is 
never serene, it is always mingled with desire, especially by its being driven 
by the sui conservandi. Thus, often, immediate reaction based on tacit knowl-
edge must be stopped by the normative filter, and what is left is the dilemma 
between survival and destruction. If the middle expresses some ideal of 
mental balance it shall very often be either a compromise or an illusion. 
Phronesis allows for no compromises. The individual must be ready to “scar-
ify” and even to sacrifice himself, and though this claim might not be conse-
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quently argued by Aristotle, it is the consequence of the essence of his 
thought. One loses Aristotle by interpretating him as a pragmatic, and espe-
cially one lets go of his Platonic core.  
To the general who is confronted with the unexpected event which pre-
sents him to the choice between surrendering or losing half of the army, there 
exists no compromise. Especially not when one considers that the surrender-
ing will be killed or transformed into slaves. Often, however, the value of 
honour will be stronger than the value of life, and there shall be no further 
value above honour. Probable the possibility of obtaining balance increases 
when values are not that unconditionally adhered to, but this opens up the 
pragmatic interpretation of values, and hence a negotiation of the situation 
which makes one unable to be worthy of the event. After all one cannot 
compare death to slavery, since the more specific information about both is 
lacking. One must choose. 
A choice made on the basis of honor only shall often neither seem strate-
gic, nor favorable to the interests of the individual and the community. Here 
we touch the ambiguous concept of the enlightened self-interest, the core of 
liberalism and neoclassic economy. It must be evident that normativity 
suspends with this concept because the concept of information loses its sense, 
unless we confront delicate problems of understanding the other person. This 
is due to the fact that although norms might be influenced by deeper knowl-
edge of the event, they do not change; and it is due to the fact that normativ-
ity implies acting for the norm’s own sake, hereby suspending with personal 
interest.   
If the general said: I did what I felt was right, or I acted as I ought to do, 
these arguments can be transformed to a discursive level, they are subjects of 
consciousness, and hence not tacit. The problem, and this refers to why 
Aristotle writes a book on protreptic, is that values are virtually discursive – 
alternatively they were not social and they could not be addressed at the 
common good. Hence, it is right, of course that values as the mediated and 
context-based articulations are relative as to history, but never to situation, if 
they do not have to be pragmatic – and further, values cannot be hybrids. 
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Phronesis and management versus leadership 
Generally phronesis is translated into “practical wisdom”, not so often into 
“prudency”.  
”Practical wisdom” gives 33 millions hit, and “practical wisdom, man-
agement” gives 331.000 hits on the internet. It is beyond this article to give 
an overview of the literature, instead I shall choose some important, and 
typical contributions. 
On the internet address www.thewisdommeme.com/Articles1/ practical-
wisdom.htm we can read a definition which answers to common sense:  
‘Wisdom has been described in many different ways over the centuries. 
Here Joseph W. Meeker sums it up in a profound paragraph from his arti-
cle “Wisdom and Wilderness”: 
“Wisdom is a state of the human mind characterized by profound under-
standing and deep insight. It is often, but not necessarily, accompanied by 
extensive formal knowledge. Unschooled people can acquire wisdom, and 
wise people can be found among carpenters, fishermen, or housewives. 
Wherever it exists, wisdom shows itself as a perception of the relativity 
and relationships among things. It is an awareness of wholeness that does 
not lose sight of particularity or concreteness, or of the intricacies of inter-
relationships. It is where left and right brain come together in a union of 
logic and poetry and sensation, and where self-awareness is no longer at 
odds with awareness of the otherness of the world. 
Wisdom cannot be confined to a specialized field, nor is it an academic 
discipline; it is the consciousness of wholeness and integrity that tran-
scends both. Wisdom is complexity understood and relationships ac-
cepted.” (http://www.wisdompage.com/meekart.html). 
This is a definition, which aptly grasp the common conception of wisdom. 
The important issue is, of course what profound understanding and deep 
insight are.  
Ever since Socrates, it belongs to the criterion of wisdom that the wise 
cannot say: “I am wise”. Actually it is not that common, or acceptable, to 
speak of oneself as wise, more often it is a predicate given to an individual by 
others. However to render this predicate following the definition only the 
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wise can nominate the wise, since it must be presupposed that he who calls a 
person wise, must know himself from own experience what profound insight 
and deep understanding are. However, the predicate “wise” is often given due 
to peculiar traits of character (kind (not unconditionally, though), temperate, 
modest, able to give advice, emphatic, just and decent, and almost as a rule 
“old”), and hence through folk psychology – which definitely via Christianity 
often mirrors old Greek virtues. The Greeks were well aware of this dilemma, 
and Aristotle saw like his contemporaries wisdom as a state of behavior and 
mind realized among peers, and probably only existing between friends as a 
potential, reciprocal social relation. Wisdom demanded age and a right life. It 
could well be argued that to acknowledge wisdom in another person, one 
must possess it oneself. 
It is also acknowledged that wisdom might not be proportional with the 
knowledge of the scholar. But this concession already presupposes that there 
exist common traits in different lives which might form wisdom. This, how-
ever, shall most often be prudence, and hence not necessarily based on a 
normative attitude. However, peculiar enough, we do not deduct wisdom 
from religious belief. The simple man shall perhaps know much about the 
tragedies of the will to power, desires and ambition, and the hell of manual 
labor, or the-win-and-lose in horse-race, and such knowledge is to be found 
in plenty in “The Nicomachean Ethic”, which could guide on the realization 
of virtues. Here philosophy is caught in its most common trap the one of a 
historically relative folk psychology. It is performed in much philosophy 
from Descartes’ “Les passions de l’âme” to Kant’s “Anthropologie”, and to 
the works of Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer, and it is often a determination 
of existentialist philosophy to fall victim to this trap. It characterizes 
Nietzsche’s opus that he tried to escape it, and the magnificent “Sein und 
Zeit” by Heidegger that he almost really succeeded. 
One often speaks about a wise person, when one actually means an “ex-
perienced” person in relation to life in general. However, since it seems very 
common to speak about experience in relation to life in general, we must 
know what this is, but even if this concept is not historically relative, it is 
hard to define. Of course phronesis must also have this content, since it tries 
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to escape the albatross of thought referred to by Plato and Baudelaire sitting 
defenseless at the deck of the ship caught in the power of its own wings.   
The awareness of wholeness is also a commonplace, probably with its 
origin in Plato’s concept of “euboulia” in “Res publica”, the capacity of the 
philosopher-rulers to overlook the needs of the society as a whole. It could 
actually be a normative virtue, but most often it is strategically belonging to 
the general’s cognitive and experiential repertoire.  
The union of logic and poetical sense is yet another commonplace which 
hardly gives any sense to a more critical reflection, as is also the case with 
the union of the general and concrete aspects of experience, although not with 
the capacity to understand both yourself and others. Such commonplaces 
which are all too often tacitly accepted have to be analyzed to the bottom. For 
example it might not be possible to understand yourself nor the other person 
at any degree approaching certainty. I myself would state that it is impossi-
ble.
The problem coming up immediately here is that there are neither analyti-
cal criteria nor practical criteria of fulfillment of such wisdom. Since we can 
easily say that somebody is wiser than another, who might be wise too, we 
must possess criteria of comparison. There must be some presupposed 
evaluation criteria hidden in this use of the language game, but they are 
extremely difficult to grasp since they differ by situation. The only criterion 
of wisdom must be the wise man’s capacity to handle the event. But what it 
might mean to handle the event is also obviously bound to end either in an 
infinite regression, or in a plethora of subjective assessments. 
The concept of mental balance inherent in this definition was also put 
forward by Plato who introduced the musical metaphor of harmony, and even 
a more beautiful one, the “synarmotton”, the running at trotting speed by our 
internal dialogical partners of the mind, from the “Laws”. 
All too often such conceptions of wisdom are transferred to the use of 
practical wisdom in relation to management without critical balance. 
The use of phronesis as practical wisdom ranges from serious social sci-
ence to more esoteric and utterly popular contributions, as the tacit knowl-
edge of the Dreyfus-brothers, as woman wisdom, cunning intelligence and, 
promises of swift transformation of your own life, to the guarantee of finding 
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happiness, and ending probably with the appeal to practical, real farmer 
knowledge and Machiavellian cynicism.   
Let us look at four types of what must be judged as serious approaches to 
the use of phronesis in the social sciences: 
1.  Phronesis as determinant of meta-concepts of research 
The work of Bent Flyvbjerg ought to be mentioned here. In his book 
“Making Social Science Matter”, he argues that instead of trying to copy the 
natural sciences, the social sciences should be practiced on the basis of 
phronesis. Phronetic social science is based on four value-rational questions: 
(1) Where are we going? (2) Who gains and who loses, by which mecha-
nisms of power? (3) Is this development desirable? (4) What should we do 
about it? (Bent Flyvbjerg 2001) (these “why’s” are a bit ironically very close 
to the why’s of the firm propagated by Ikujiro Nonaka).  
Flybjerg wants to give phronesis a social-historical basis by introducing 
the concept of “progressive phronesis”, leaning on Jürgen Habermas’ theories 
of communication, and on Michel Foucault’s theories of power. Even if it can 
be doubted whether human beings have acquired more insight into the norms, 
not to speak of the question of whether the norms have changed, the condi-
tions of their “implementation” have definitely changed. Probably norms 
conceived as ethical value-zones in contrast to morals only change when 
power-relations change fundamentally, i.e. in their essence; which is the same 
as a rather great change of the structures of production, the range of popula-
tion and the basis of knowledge. The appearances of the norms have certainly 
got different communicative conditions, but power has been even more 
diffused to all levels of life and complicated by what Foucault named “bio-
politics” during the last decades. The formal distance between people has 
diminished, but not the real differences as both to the absolute and the rela-
tive conditions of life. If “progressive” in relation to phronesis should mean 
more empathy, more ethical imagination, more sensitivity to values, this is 
wrong. New faculties of communication have developed, but there have 
developed no “new” sense of the other (just look sixty years back in time, or 
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just now to Africa), no strengthened love for your neighbor, no new forms of 
solidarity – even if solidarity with new agendas do exist. 
Flyvbjerg interprets phronesis as a multiplicity of perspectives, referring 
to Nietzsche, but however democratic this might seem to make research the 
problem of the synthesis, i.e. of the consistency and inherent hierarchy of 
perspectives cannot be neglected: 
“Hence, ‘objectivity’ in phronetic organization research is not ‘contempla-
tion without interest’ but employment of ‘a variety of perspectives and af-
fective interpretations in the service of knowledge’” (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
But even though neither apophantic axiomatically sound knowledge nor 
totally corroborated single-perspective-hypotheses can be claimed to exist in 
social science, multi-perspectives must rely on a criterion of epistemic and 
logic compatibility which can only be deduced from a pragmatically inter-
preted system of values. The alternative is eclecticism or “pragmaticism”.   
One may object that if the prudential aspect is too heavily stressed in rela-
tion to the normative – and Flyvbjerg wants to do the oxymoron science of 
the concrete almost forgetting the Greek dictum that nothing is so practical as 
a good theory – and if phronesis is seen as a meta-concept of research, in 
spite of the attractive intentions of such an initiative, then social science bases 
itself on mere prudency, unless it is interpreted beyond any techne, i.e. be-
yond a method. This is in relation to research a contradiction in adjecto. 
Social research is often driven to be pragmatic through the very urge to shape 
heuristics and methods, and to secure reliability and validity. Hence, the 
norm of truth is easily differentiated from the other three canonical norms of 
Western culture, the good, the just, and beauty, and even in the Popperean 
version it is a principle of the prudency of research. Only a genuine, closed 
system (with due respect to Gödel) can come near to the perfectly normative 
by defining its empirical field unambiguously.  
In the context of action research, and in particular what concerns the case 
method, interpretative effort legitimated by some interpretation of phronesis 
must be explicitly built on normative perspectives. Phronesis could here 
mean that the full consequences of a normative framework to the assessment 
of data-creation were elaborated with the utmost care.  
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2.  Phronesis as a liberating organizational strategy of learning. 
Another serious approach is presented in the article “Dear Prudence: An 
Essay on Practical Wisdom in Strategy Making” by Matt Statler, Johan Roos, 
and Bart Victor (2007).  
The issue is to find strategies for organizational learning which contain 
normativity but have a prudential character. In the author’s own words: 
“If we presume an organizational ontology of complex, dynamic change, 
then what role remains for strategic intent? If managerial action is said to 
consist of adaptive responsiveness, then what are the foundations of value 
on the basis of which strategic decisions can be made? In this essay, we 
respond to these questions and extend the existing strategy process litera-
ture by turning to the Aristotelian concept of prudence, or practical wis-
dom. According to Aristotle, practical wisdom involves the virtuous ca-
pacity to make decisions and take actions that promote the “good life” for 
the “polis”. We explore contemporary interpretations of this concept in 
literature streams adjacent to strategy and determine that practical wisdom 
can be developed by engaging in interpretative dialogue and aesthetically-
rich experience. With these elements in view, we re-frame strategy proc-
esses as occasions to develop the human capacity for practical wisdom.”  
I agree with the overall perspective of the authors, but the questions as to 
whether wisdom can be learned, and hence, both taught through the experi-
ence of dialogue, and strategically furthered by organizational aesthetics, are 
certainly implicated here. As a professor in a business school, though memo-
rizing all the reservations a chair in management philosophy might produce, 
it is hard to deny that some aspects of practical wisdom are able to be suc-
cessfully taught. But the concerns already hold by Plato in the “Meno” 
whether such knowledge is of a trans-rational kind, cannot be subdued. We 
speak of types of knowledge then, which can only be transferred through the 
classical institution of apprenticeship, or at least demand new forms of colle-
gial teaching. Stattler and Roos suggest the narrative and the dialogues as 
instruments to further the incorporated learning which is a core of phronesis, 
but especially the narrative might create problems.  
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It could be claimed that it is very difficult to stage the scenarios and ex-
periences which will produce wisdom. Actually, wisdom happens. It there 
can be traced any pattern in its evolvement it is the complicated patterns 
inherent in the lines between events.  
The Greek protreptic discipline tried to develop wisdom in leaders by us-
ing value-based philosophical dialogue, but this discipline was built on a 
unity of culture and a lifelong pedagogical environment (the paideia), which 
gave it the utmost chances to succeed – which it however not did at all times 
when we considerate the ethical-moral role of the mentor or political adviser, 
since the protreptic guide was often banned by the ruler which he was serv-
ing, like Plato by Dionysius, or executed by the ruler, like Seneca by Nero.  
3.  Phronesis as a strategy of knowledge management 
The author of “Managing Flow”, Ikujiro Nonaka (2008), is seen as Japan’s 
most renowned managerial scholar famous for his work on knowledge man-
agement. In “Managing Flow”, Nonaka summarizes and extends of his 
lifetime work on knowledge management. 
However, what is of interest to us is that Nonaka understands the impor-
tance of the event in relation to practical wisdom. In Managing Flow, he 
Nonaka quotes Soichiro Honda: “You have to grasp the atmosphere of the 
occasion,” Honda said, “which exists only for a particular moment. A joke is 
all in the timing, in understanding what the present evokes. To joke is to 
understand human emotion and be present for it.”  
However, Nonaka’s perspective is genuinely pragmatic and strategic. He 
uses his life long experience with analyzing the Rylean opposition between 
knowing how and knowing what, in relation to knowing why, in order to 
identify practical wisdom with the Aristotelean “techne” in opposition to 
“episteme”. Techné, which is pejoratively judged by Plato and Aristotle, is in 
Nonaka transformed into a way, an organizational method, and an ethos, in 
which knowledge can be shared. Hence, community feeling and mutuality is 
seen as the basis of innovation, which could point to a normative stance.  
This is clear especially when Nonaka emphasizes that “Why is ultimately 
a question of purpose: Why do we exist? In most organizations, people are not 
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encouraged to keep asking questions.” Thus, Nonaka’s concept of a knowl-
edge-creating company is ideally the kind of community in which classical 
Western virtues such as recognition and honesty prevail.  
However, it does not seem necessary that the repertoire of tacit knowl-
edge, non-discursive knowledge, emotions, not yet matured ideas, hunches, 
etc., should necessarily have the normative content which Nonaka advocates 
– besides perhaps being the possible subject of a community feeling.  
Especially his idea of the “virtuous artisans,” is complicated for several 
reasons. Although a strong sense of mutuality existed among English silk 
weavers in the nineteenth century when they collectively opposed industrial-
ism, the skilled workers were the conservative core of the Weimar Republic 
and a driving force in Nazism. The skilled workers in the late nineteenth 
century steel industry in the USA strongly opposed the unskilled emigrant 
laborers which is understandable but not that easy to defend. Artisan faculties 
and manual skills seem to relate empirically to the same small degree to 
normative values as does scholarship to humanist normativity. The possible 
normativity peculiar to an artisan “phronesis” would rather be chauvinist, 
totalitarian and hostile to the environment and to all intruders. The guild 
could easily be seen historically as a germ to “micro-fascism”.   
For Nonaka, phronesis is to know “what must be done “, where techne is 
“knowing-how,” and episteme is “knowing-why”. Here it seems that epis-
teme represents the normative aspect by being the domain of understanding 
organization’s purpose. However in order to stabilize the organization 
phronesis must be broadly distributed. The phronetic leader must inspire 
timely judgment in the employees by building a culture which facilitates 
depth level experience and communication, and informal relations. We are 
here able to identify the complexity or perhaps absurdity of strategic man-
agement as distributed practical wisdom.  
Ikujiro Nonaka and Ryoko Toyama write in the abstract of the article 
“Strategic management as distributed practical wisdom (phronesis)”:                    
“This article claims that effective strategic management requires distrib-
uted wisdom (which the philosopher Aristotle called phronesis). Strategy 
is created out of one's existential belief or commitment to a vision of the 
future, the ability to interpret one's environment and resources subjec-
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tively, and the interaction between subjectivity and objectivity. These 
abilities need to be distributed among organizational members. Strategy as 
distributed phronesis thus emerges from practice to pursue common good-
ness in each particular situation since a firm is an entity that pursues a 
universal ideal and a particular reality at the same time. Such idealistic 
pragmatism means that in a specific and dynamic context knowledge can 
be created and refined to become wisdom.” 
One must ask if it is safe to claim that any firm in the capitalist market is at 
all able to seek common goodness as anything else than a strategic-branding 
initiative? This “particular reality” is defined by profit and power, and this 
does not go along with normativity unless it by chance favors profit. How-
ever, this should be no argument against the possibilities of using the new 
pressures, due to world-crisis on enterprises, as levers to increase social 
responsibility, sustainability, and to conceptualize new types of bottom lines. 
The question is only whether this is already an established performance in 
any firm? If this is not the case it might serve as an ideology of, and as an 
excuse for, refined lean-techniques.   
4.  Phronesis as a narrative strategy 
The story is the way in which an event is related and in which its causal 
inscription is presented by everyone, be it the lay man or the expert. Recently 
there has developed a great amount of literature on the strategic use of the 
narrative (Boje 1999; Czarniawska 1997, 1998) but not much on phronesis 
and the narrative, although considerable amounts on practical wisdom (in the 
capacity of “experience”) and storytelling, a relation so obvious from the 
fable. However, there is much misuse of the concept of phronesis in relation 
to the conceptual framework of Aristotle, and much confusion of prudency 
for normative wisdom. This new trend in managerial theory and practice 
relies on works of the event inside philosophy and history mainly drawing on 
theories of memory in its more common sense as developed by Paul Ricoeur, 
and not on the more esoteric works of Edmund Husserl, Henri Bergson and 
Gilles Deleuze – psychological science does not play as important a role here 
as one should presume.  
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Aristotle remarks in his Art of Rhetoric, III, 13, 3, 1414 b: “for narrative 
(diégesis) only belongs in a manner to forensic speech (the so called ‘genos 
dikánikon’, OFK)”, since the forensic speech is characterized by refutation 
and “epideiksis” which are also found in epic. Forensic speech is a re-
structuring of individual and community-memory through the creation of 
coherent and consistent story-lines. Epic is a draft to transform this re-
structuring of personal memory into a fictive realm of remembrance and hope 
which challenges “objective” reality by confirming its apparent factuality. 
But the story is also the construction of the reality which it discovers and yet 
never totally reveals. Since epic and drama as discourses exclude the problem 
of truth both in the apophantic sense and in the sense of “veritas est adaequa-
tio intellectus et rei”, it can never be epistemic, but its lack of the demand of 
objective truth which follows from its forensic roots transforms it into an 
advanced rhetoric. Hence it is often, though not exclusively, hostile to 
phronesis.  
Probably the most important opus of the narrative since world war two is 
the one of French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, but research within literary 
theory has had a great impact too, and anthropological and philosophical 
analyses of the symbol and of the myth also play an important role – like the 
work of Ernst Cassirer and the hermeneutical philosophy of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. 
Ricoeur’s concept of the narrative emphasizes its function as an incorpo-
ration of the different experiences of time in the light of a reconciliation of 
mimesis and phronesis transcending its severe distinction by Aristotle. Ri-
coeur analyses the narrative through a differentiation of mimesis into three 
levels: The mimesis-I is a “prefiguration” of the field of action, it refers to a 
pre-reflective cogito og games of experience, language and truth. The mime-
sis-II is a “configuration” of the field of action, it refers to the imaginative 
configuration of the pre-reflective experiences, through the “pragma”, the 
plot, thus it is the essence of memory. The mimesis-III is a “refiguration” of 
the field of action it is the projection of the imaginative or “fictive" perspec-
tive offered at the level of mimesis-II onto one’s own memory (Ricoeur 
1984).  
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A very positive interpretation of Aristotle inspired by Paul Ricoeur is 
made by Richard Kearney in his book “On Stories” from 2002 by claiming 
that the myth in its development into the historical narrative and into fiction 
tried to mirror events through the norms. Thus the mimesis of Aristotle is 
interpreted as “a creative description of the world such that hidden patterns 
and significance can unfold”. Stories thus could be “a newly imagined way of 
being in the world.” He thus claims that phronesis in the capacity of wisdom 
is a part of the sense- and intentionality-creating storytelling. Hence, stories 
can be claimed to produce the basis of community as an immediate and 
reflective concept. This actually sums up the use of the narrative in recent 
management theories. 
“Kearney suggests that people need a story which is recognisable to others 
(a public story) on which to model and thus share their own stories. This 
process of triple mimesis, refiguring one’s own life story in terms which 
are recognisable in the public sphere, may then provoke catharsis (the 
ability to ‘feel what wretches feel’) in the listener through phronesis (the 
application of good judgment in human conduct, and the ability to recog-
nise truth in fiction) and a process of ethical evaluation made possible by a 
shared ethos” (Roeper 2005: 174). 
It is thus tempting to join phronesis to mimesis, catharsis and ethos, but why 
does Aristotle exclude this? 
The gospels prove that normativity can be communicated by the narrative, 
but Christ also presents us directly discursively to his message. The drama 
and the epic often incorporate direct, monolog- or dialogic-statements about 
their content, and hence, opening up to an overt meta-level in the presenta-
tion. The point is probably that Greek drama does not refer to the normative 
dimension in the capacity of social norms only, but to laws of life as a part of 
nature, to “heimarmene”, to fate which is directly cruel, unjust, and with a 
kind of truth which destroys the fourfold union of the good, the just, the true, 
and the beautiful. Nature overcomes the fragile social reality in these dramas, 
and hence excludes normative phronesis – but not the younger Stoic phrone-
sis of proving worthy of the event.   
The power of the story lies in the often delicate balance between ambigu-
ity and relative precision of referential framework which it produces. How-
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ever, it is always first and foremost its own context, so it has no referential or 
representational relation to truth. 
Even if stories are constructed by logical means as in detective stories and 
scientific fiction the capacities of judgment and intuition would dominate the 
process of creation since it has such an intimate relation to personal experi-
ence.  
Most people would probably think that the best epical and dramatic au-
thors are “wise” persons. But this capacity is of a prudential and technical 
kind. The impact of judgment and intuition is probably one reason why 
prudency is suggested in this context.   
It is almost evident that Shakespeare exhibits great knowledge of the hu-
man psyche, the social conditions of life, and the mores, and at the same time 
does not let himself be trapped in the prudential dimensions, but that his 
dramatic nerve is due the a clash of “universal” norms and values presented 
to us with such great impact. The rhetoric and protreptic basis on which 
Shakespeare writes immediately suggests the omnipresence of a phronetic 
awareness – if not a proper program.   
To Plato the meta-concept of art is mimesis, but the arts defer as to their 
representative and referring character – the famous Book III of “The State” 
deals with this. The drama excludes the presence of an author, the epic 
directly take advantage of it. Hence, drama reproduces the ambiguous charac-
ter of un-recognized surface-phenomena – although this is considerable 
moderated by the ritual origins of Greek drama – while epic contributes with 
a meta-level dependent on the degree of reflective presence of the author in 
the narrative. Perhaps his “Poetics” could be interpreted as pointing to the 
fact that Aristotle thought of phronetic gestures as a way of communicating 
which must not yield too much ambiguity to interpretation. 
Plato would not be inclined to use episteme or phronesis in relation to art, 
but his determinations of the epic does not in principle exclude our use of 
phronesis, if we conceive of mimesis as the product of an intentional act 
carving certain foci of experiential data out of the perceptional field. What 
excludes phronesis is the destruction of direct reflection through the media of 
art. Aristotle does not refuse the value of art, especially not of the drama, 
although he places phronesis and techne as opposites – the criterion used for 
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this distinction was that phronesis refers to acting as a goal in itself, but that 
techne has an external goal, proves of course archaic alone when we consider 
the Romantic conception of art as the highest form of knowledge, and also 
“l’art pour l’art”. Thus he apparently does not identify mimesis with techne, 
since mimesis is the epistemological context of the drama, and catharsis 
might be interpreted as a performance of the emotion for the emotion’s sake. 
He could be said to conceive the drama as a means to some knowledge, since 
he accepts mimesis as a concept which reproduces important aspects of 
reality – although as a result of twisting them through the perspective of the 
inherent laws of life which might appear close to the level of necessary truth. 
Mimesis might lead to “catharsis”, and thus in the capacity of a phenomenon 
of the mental economy of the happy life might be an expression of some 
“lower” phronetic effort. However to him Kant’s canonical distinction be-
tween the domains of knowledge and art would hold, because the concept of 
fate expressed in the Greek dramas cannot be said to be a pure phronetic 
incorporation. So, phronesis comes much closer to episteme and sophia than 
to techne.  
If phronesis is seen in the context of the narrative it might represent inten-
sity of the experience of life, and different from genuine programmatic 
dramas of normativity it would be prudency and hence very often covered by 
the concept of being well experienced in life. But very often experience of 
life would come close to the possessing of knowledge of the desires, power-
plays of man and the fortuitousness of the event, insights which do not neces-
sarily imply deep reflective acquaintance with the normative level, but rather 
could be said to need the latter in order to be coped with to defeat the back-
side of wisdom, resentment. However, since epics generally result from an 
incorporation of post-eventual reflectively grasped perspectives into already 
interpreted but revived awareness, with the aim of creating factuality, it could 
in principle be of a phronetic character. But the trap of exchanging sapientia 
for prudentia is obvious. Perhaps Emile Zola was a true normative writer, but 
Marcel Proust was not, today however, one would estimate the latter higher. 
Since prediction can have the form of a narrative of an objective charac-
ter, although it remains historical fiction at some level, it is suggested as a 
way to incorporate knowledge into agents in relation to for example catastro-
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phes (Stattler/Roos/Victor 2006). In the capacity of a “remembering in 
forward direction” storytelling might prepare for the activation of prepared-
ness, and because a narrative is able to express a normative stance or the 
conflict between norms, it is subject to practical wisdom. That storytelling 
and dialogue used together could create awareness of the character of coming 
events can hardly be denied in so far as these stories and these dialogues are 
initiated in freedom and from the bottom. The picture changes when the 
manager is the storyteller, and as to the impartiality of the authorities. 
The professional identity of the manager excludes the story as a means of 
genuine, normative diversity management. Some voices must not be allowed 
to be heard, and there could be no interest in every single voice. Branding has 
very often totalitarian overtones through its planned echoes into the organiza-
tion, and the freedom lacking on the shop floor cannot be invocated through 
the mutuality presumed by an authoritarian narrative voice. 
In principle the narrative could have phronetic elements, though, if the 
context is discursive, but in practice this is almost impossible. One condition 
of a limited realized normativity could be a growing community under pres-
sure in which mutuality was very strongly felt, be this can probably only 
happen under exclusion of other communities, and empirically of community 
groups too.   
5.  Phronesis as the capacity of the leader 
In English “to lead” means to go in front and to search for. Management 
etymologically origins in horse training for the circus. Recently much effort 
in theory and consultancy practice has been spent on speaking of leadership 
instead of management, and in this connection wisdom and practical wisdom 
are important concepts.  
This does not mean that all literature on leadership is ideology this is by 
far the case. Serious attempts to create new attitudes towards management are 
endeavored at.  
Bruce Lloyd, professor of strategic management at the London South 
Bank University has published an article on the internet under the program 
“Collective Wisdom Initiative” in which he writes: 
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“In essence, Wisdom is the vehicle we use for integrating our values into 
our decision-making processes. It is one thing to turn information into 
knowledge that makes things happen, but it is quite another thing to make 
the ‘right’ (/‘good’/’better’) things happen. How we actually use knowl-
edge depends on our values. Instead of moving up from knowledge to 
Wisdom, we actually move down from Wisdom to knowledge – and that 
is how we incorporate our values into our knowledge based decision-
making, as well as see the application and relevance of what we generally 
call Wisdom. It is only justified to consider that decisions can be reduced 
to a cost/benefit analysis, if it is possible to quantify all the ‘values’ ele-
ments within the equation in monetary terms. In the past values have been 
included implicitly, whereas today that dimension need to be made much 
more – if not fully – explicit. All decisions involve the integration of the 
economics dimensions of value, with the ethical (ie ‘right’) dimension of 
‘values’” (http://www.collectivewisdominitiative.org/). 
This is of course both correct, and important, and seems to support the view 
of the author of this article. The issue of integrating the economic dimensions 
of value with the ethical ones is the great task of the coming years, but will it 
be possible?  
A balanced assessment would argue that several ethical issues shall prove 
worth money, this counts especially in relation to environmental care and 
political correctness of products and processes. Care in general for people 
and society, and attentiveness to global development, and care for the em-
ployees and for the environment in particular are a branding necessity, and 
seem recently to acquire almost more weight than care for stakeholders. 
Hundreds of thousands of contributions exist to define the faculties which 
characterize the manager. One speaks of types of managers, and of different 
sorts of capacities ranging from the distinct military virtues as courage, 
fastness of decision, the ability to form an exact overview, calmness and 
keenness of survey, iron hard consequence, precision, perseverance and 
inflexibility; to the more feminine virtues like empathy, indulgence, kindness, 
tenderness, carefulness; and even to the “management of love”. Between 
these virtues lies a domain of social virtues, i.e. virtues with no distinct 
professional or gender profile like respectfulness, ability to recognize and to 
build trust, reliability, honesty, sincerity, tolerance, generosity and also love. 
These latter virtues belong everywhere in life except perhaps in the organiza-
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tion. Since management is built on the power of one group and the relative 
powerless of another and since its first commandment is evaluation of capital, 
and its second competition, it must obey the written law, but not the unwrit-
ten one of mutual human bonds. For centuries management was not responsi-
ble to the ideal of the humanist commonwealth, and the factory was no place 
in which to find freedom, equality and brotherhood among men. Things have 
changed, but in many parts of the world all is still the same.  
Not so many years ago business economists began to speak about virtues 
of leadership, and I was one of the first to do it in Denmark. In 1997 I wrote 
the book “Philosophy of Leadership. A Radical-Normative Perspective” (in 
Danish). In 2000 I published the book “Management Philosophy: A Radical-
Normative Perspective” in English, and in 2004 I wrote the Danish best seller 
“The New Leadership” (the first parts were translated 2008 into an English 
version, “The Virtue of leadership”) in which I developed twelve leadership 
virtues. 
A leadership virtue must meet three demands: It must be normatively 
founded; it must be functional in relation to managerial tasks; and it must also 
be a social virtue relating to the capacity of communication. These claims are 
hard to meet at the very same time, but one thing is sure, only phronesis can 
create the proper synthesis of them. 
A virtue is obviously an incorporated norm integrated in the life of an in-
dividual. From this follows that no virtue is exactly identical, although there 
exist some rather blurred criteria of mastering it with not that great differ-
ences between cultures. One can say that even if laws and the practical 
performance of justness might differ among cultures, the sense of justice does 
not to the same degree (there is of course a difference also what concerns the 
sense of justice between people who vindicate the sharia and the death pen-
alty, and people who do not).   
When phronesis is the meta-capacity of virtues it means that these virtues 
are subject to normativity and that they must have a spiritual, existentialist 
and humanist dimension. Spirituality however, is problematic as more than 
the right to develop one’s own meaningfulness in freedom – to speak about 
“sense-making” shall come dangerously close to a totalitarian expression. 
Spiritual leadership might implicate too idealist a view of the leader’s possi-
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bilities, enforcing the already produced schizophrenia in his poor person. In 
the amazing book “Leading by Wisdom” by Peter Pruzan, Professor Emeritus 
at the Copenhagen Business School and his wife, Kirsten Pruzan Mikkelsen 
based on interviews of business leaders all over the globe, spirituality in 
relation to leadership is defined as to rely on the essence of being; to realize a 
deep connection with a force deeper than ourselves; to use principles from 
many belief systems, and to live them as a natural way of life; and to be able 
to answer man's quest into his innate divinity.  
These ideals are of course beautiful and they overrule more pragmatic, 
practical wisdom through the classical, religious image of wisdom. But one 
must ask oneself if they can be realized in the setting of the organization. In 
this light wisdom cannot be built on compromise, but even if we wish that it 
were not so, they too have to be transformed at the strategic level. 
To my opinion perennial wisdom cannot be reconciled with leadership, 
i.e. with plain practical wisdom, or prudency, from this simple reason that the 
manager is hired to break the golden rule when necessary. Neither could real 
phronesis. If there is just a slight feeling of doubt about legitimate reasons the 
leader must dismiss himself and not the employee, but he seldom does. 
Phronesis and action research 
Perhaps a chance to save phronesis as a normatively founded concept from 
practical wisdom and prudency would be to manifest its working in the 
context of action research. This was already done brilliantly by Olav Eike-
land (2008). 
The main problems then would be how one approaches the other person 
without making compromises as to respect and even compassion, while at the 
same time “getting information”. Since all social research has a political bias, 
action research is forced to develop a platform of political reflectivity, and of 
course phronesis is the meta-concept of politics.  
Unless prudence is controlled firmly by norms it could easily become an-
other form of an advanced rhetoric, trying to allure the other person into 
convictions not proper to his own attitudes towards life.  
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Having elaborated for the last five years on the classical Greek protreptic
tradition (Kirkeby 2009), the art to help the other person to turn himself 
towards his own basic values, I developed it as an instrument of action re-
search and as an instrument of organizational management and coaching. A 
discipline forming already the basis of the Greek executive academies from 
around 400 B.C., and apparently only taken up by me, and independently by 
Olav Eikeland, in his powerful work on phronesis (Eikeland 2008) – a fact 
which I can only explain through the Scandinavian focus on democratic and 
dialogical management. I used it for work-place evaluation (the Confedera-
tion of Danish Industries has recently applied it), personal coaching, and 
organizational dialogue.  
Since phronesis is the meta- and core-concept of protreptic this protreptic 
attitude might be inherited by action research. Niels Arvid Sletteroed devel-
oped protreptic further at a genuinely original basis in his doctorial thesis 
which is defended this autumn (Sletteroed 2009).  
Actually we might speak about the virtues of the action-researcher. Such 
virtues would be sense of the event, righteousness, generosity, fairness, 
sympathy, empathy and compassion. The Stoic virtues of “akroasis” and 
“prosoché”, the capacities to listen and to display an intense attention, are 
extremely relevant here. 
To master intuition, and ethymemic (abductive) conclusions, and to be 
able to do an emphatic maieutics, are further attitudes strengthening commu-
nicative capacities – as they condition proper management. 
Phronesis then must be understood as the will to display an unyielding 
self-reflectivity, destroying every strategic and manipulative disposition in 
oneself. This cannot be done without a phronetic basis, uncompromisingly 
focused on the realization of values in every ever so tiny act. 
It demands self-control and hard work to dispense with the cunning aspect 
of prudence in guiding an investigation, but it can certainly be done, and the 
opportunities are much better than the ones offered the protreptic leader, 
because power could be excluded. The ideals of the protreptic dialogue, 
namely symmetry and co-creation of the event, can thus be the maxims of a 
humanist action research.   
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Let us draw the lines to the sense of the event. What does it mean to see 
action research as an implementation of phronesis? 
A symmetric event is an event in which is created an empty place between 
the interlocutors. An empty place means a place which is yet untrodden by 
projections, meanings, and power-realizations. This place ought to be at the 
same time a refuge, a place of freedom and the centre of creation and becom-
ing. What happens must never be anticipated, it must be given free to take 
place. Thus the persons asked about for example their conditions of work 
should be able to borrow both well-known and unexplored expressions from 
their own voice, and tacit perspectives given for disposal to them by the 
investigator. In these processes there might arise a “conceptual invocation”, 
renaming what happens, with an authority by the asked. Thus the wording by 
the asked could ideally form the content even of new theoretical concepts. 
The event might then be present as a mutual consciousness of an event of 
the event, from the reflective platform of which lives could be seen and 
articulated in a new light, and the past re-interpreted and new futures pro-
jected.  
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